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EUROPE'S EVOLVING REGULATORY
STRATEGY FOR GMOS-THE ISSUE OF
CONSISTENCY WITH WTO LAW:
OF KINE AND BRINE
Robert Howse
& Petros C. Mavroidis*
INTRODUCTION
This Essay deals with one question: If challenged, how
would regulatory restrictions on genetically modified organisms
("GMOs") be judged by a World Trade Organization' ("WTO")
adjudicating body. Many of the controversies about the effect of
WTO law on domestic regulation have been influenced by the
view that the law as it stands may well impede the ability of governments to regulate new and uncertain risks to health and the
environment. The result in the Beef Hormones case ("Hormones
case") is often cited for this proposition. In this Essay we aim to
show that, contrary to an increasingly widespread popular perception, if WTO law is properly interpreted, GMO-related measures, where non-discriminatory against other WTO Members,
can pass the test of consistency with even the most stringent of
relevant WTO rules.
Since it is real world regulations that are actually subject to
challenge in WTO dispute settlement, we have chosen the evolving approach in the EU to the regulation of GMOs in order to
illustrate this proposition. It is EU regulation, and U.S. objections to it, that have made GMOs a high profile trade issue, in
the first place. And European regulation is explicitly and selfconsciously based on a precautionary or conservative approach
to new or not well known risks. Finally, the EU has one of the
few already highly developed regulatory regimes for GMOs.
In Part I, we provide a brief account of the potentially rele* University of Michigan and University of Neuchatel and CEPR respectively. The

authors would like to cordially thank Henrik Horn af Rantzien, Joost Pauwelyn, Lorenzo Sigismondi, Michael Trebilcock, Julie Soloway, Lisi Tuerck, and Rick Lempert for
very helpful discussions.
1. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)
[hereinafter WTO Agreement].
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vant WTO Agreements that can be used as a benchmark in examining the consistency of GMO-related measures. We conclude, for reasons explained in the section, that the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures 2 ("SPS") is the forum that will in all likelihood entertain challenges against measures prohibiting or limiting the use
of GMOs. In Part II we provide an account of the WTO case-law
on the SPS Agreement. In this section, we aim to clarify what the
Appellate Body and Panels have stated so far when dealing with
SPS-related issues. We apply the dicta in Part III to GMO-related
measures and in the final section we conclude.
I. WTO PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO GMOS
A. In General: The Three Musketeers
The WTO contract, with some notable exceptions like the
Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights3
("TRIPS"), is not about regulatory harmonization. The traditional paradigm between the WTO and General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") is essentially that WTO members
are free to enact their domestic policies.4 Such policies, to the
extent that they might affect trade flows (actually or potentially,
as standing GATT-WTO case-law has made it clear), will be
judged WTO-compatible if they respect the non-discrimination
principle and are enacted and applied transparently and nonarbitrarily, so as to avoid hidden or embedded protectionism.
This point was made clear in the recent notorious ShrimpTurtle litigation where the Appellate Body ruled that conditioning market access to prior adoption of domestic policies is not
2. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/final_e.htm [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
3. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
4. See Frieder Roessler, IncreasingMarket Access Under Regulatory Heterogeneity, in REGULATORY REFORM AND INTERNATIONAL MARKET OPENNESS: OECD PROCEEDINGS 117-30
(1996); see also David Leebron, Lying Down with Procrustes: An Analysis of Harmonization
Claims, in FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 41, 65 (.
Bhagwati & R.E. Hudec eds., 1996); Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, Trade Liberalization and Regulatory Diversity: Reconciling Competitive Markets with Competitive Politics, 6
EUR. J.L. & ECON. 5, 21-22 (1998).
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per se inconsistent with the WTO rules.5 However, some earlier
GATT jurisprudence has suggested measures that are non-discriminatory with respect to the country of origin of products that
may nevertheless violate Article XI of the GATT and/or the nondiscrimination principle in Article III of the GATT, if they treat
products differently on the basis of the manner in which they are
produced.6 However, as the Appellate Body has stressed in another case, depending on the non-discrimination provision at issue and the regulatory context, a wide range of factors may be
relevant to distinguish products as "unlike."7 Let us take the example of a WTO Member that wishes to distinguish the treatment of maize from that afforded to GMO-maize for health reasons. A WTO Member adopting its health policy might be making distinctions between two otherwise "like or directly
competitive products" and thus violate its obligations under
GATT Article III (national treatment). In such a case, an appropriate reading of Article 111(4) of the GATT would accept that
5. See United States-Import Prohibitionof Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report
of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998). The point that WTO rules
apply on a context of regulatory diversity has been subsequently confirmed. See United
States-Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/
DS108/AB/R (Feb. 8, 2000). It should be noted that the outcome reached in the two
cited reports is perfectly compatible with public international law, amounting to the
proposition that no transfer of national sovereignty to the international plane should
be presumed.
6. See, e.g., United States-Restrictionson Imports of Tuna, DS21/R (Sep. 3, 1991) (not
adopted) and DS29/R (Jun. 16, 1994) (not adopted).
7. Japan-Taxeson Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS8/AB/
R (Oct. 4 1996). See also Chile-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS1lO/AB/R (Dec. 13, 1999). However, a panel recently came to the conclusion
that WTO Members could not, consistent with the National Treatment Obligation, distinguish between products based on their harmfulness to human health. European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbesetos-Containing Products, Report of the
Panel, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000). This finding has now been reversed by the Appellate Body, which has held that the health effects of products may be relevant to the
analysis of whether they are "like," both in terms of physical characteristics and consumer perceptions and behavior. Whatever the "physical" differences between GM and
non GM food products, there is a great deal of evidence that many consumers perceive
these as "unlike." The Appellate Body also held that even where two products are considered "like," they can still be distinguished in regulations, provided the distinction in
question does not result in the protection of domestic production. European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-containing Products, Report of the Appellate
Body, AB-2000-11, (Mar. 12, 2001). On the flimsy legal basis for the product/process
distinction in GATT law and jurisprudence and the implications of the JapaneseAlcohol
case for that distinction, see Robert Howse & Donald Regan, The Product/ProcessDistinction-An Illusory Basisfor Disciplining "Unilateralism" in Trade Policy, II EUR. J. INT'L. L.
249 (2000).
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these products are "unlike," if only because there are differences
between them that will likely matter a great deal from the perspective of the consumer. Moreover, the products are being distinguished based on the operational requirements of a non-protectionist scheme for health regulation, and there is no element
of discrimination between domestic products and imports built
into the distinction in question-domestically-produced GMOmaize is treated no better nor worse than imported GMOmaize.'
Moreover, the WTO paradigm does not make even the nondiscriminatory principle into an absolute. Thus, even where
found to be discriminatory, in some cases, a Member's policies
could be justified under Article XX, for example as necessary for
the protection of human or animal life or health XX(b). This is
subject to the general proviso, the "chapeau" of Article XX, that
such policies not be applied in such a manner as to constitute
arbitrary or unjustified discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade. Article XX of GATT is one possible forum to
entertain GMO-related issues; this could happen if elements of
discrimination between imports and domestic products were
found to be built into a Member's approach to GMO regulation.
As the Appellate Body emphasized in JapaneseAlcohol, the factors
that may distinguish like from unlike products are open-ended,
and the analysis of likeness is fact-intensive and must be done on
a case-by-case basis. Thus, it is far from unimaginable that the
Appellate Body might find that some distinctions in a Member's
overall scheme for regulating GMOs result in less favourable
treatment of "like products," as opposed to differential treatment of products that are "unlike." This would depend on a
detailed examination of scientific and regulatory facts.
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade9 ("TBT") is
another possible WTO forum for the examination of GMO-re8. In the real word, unlike this simplified example, it is not always easy to discern
whether there might be protectionist or discriminatory elements built into an apparently neutral scheme and its application. This is a major rationale for the sanitary and
phytosanitary ("SPS") provisions that we will discuss in due course, which impose particular disciplines on the regulatory process, even where the overall scheme may well be
non-discriminatory.
9. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
Annex IA, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs.e/legalfe/final-e.htm [hereinafter
TBT Agreement].
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lated regulations: A WTO Member could very well, through enactment of a technical regulation in accordance with Article 2.2
of the TBT, provide for compulsory labelling of all GMO-treated
goods. In such a case, if challenged, the WTO Member at hand
will have to demonstrate (provided of course, that the complaining party has absolved its burden of proof) that it respected
the TBT disciplines when enacting its labelling requirements.
Finally, to the extent that the WTO Member adopts a sanitary or phytosanitary measure (fearing for example, the spread
of a disease through importation of GMO-treated goods) it
might be called to justify its policies under the SPS Agreement.
If the test in all three Agreements (GATT, TBT, and SPS)
was identical, the question of whether to subordinate GMO-related concerns would beimmaterial. This is hardly the case
though. Except for temporary or provisional measures, the SPS
Agreement is the only one that requires that regulations be
based on scientific evidence. Consequently, in what follows we
examine the relationship between the three Agreements.
B. TBT andSPS
The relationship between the TBT and the SPS Agreements
is at first glance quite clear: Article 1.5 of the TBT provides that
the provisions of the TBT Agreement do not apply to measures
defined as Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures in Annex A of
the SPS Agreement. The definition of Annex A is broad, and
includes almost all relevant measures to protect human or
animal health, life, or the envii'onment, generally arising from
importation of foods and agricultural products. Essentially all
existing GMO-related regulation in developed countries is characterized in this fashion, and thus one can confidently say that
SPS applies exclusively. However, ethical rationales have sometimes been stated for restrictions on genetic engineering, as well
as rationales connected to the social economy required to preserve indigenous agriculture and traditional ways of life. Where
regulations are explicitly addressed to these purposes, the application of SPS exclusively may need to be reconsidered.
C. SPS and Article XX of GATT: An Issue
The relationship between Article XX of GATT and the SPS
Agreement has not been clarified in the WTO case-law as of yet.
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This is due to a number of reasons. First, the General Interpretative Note, which regulates the relationship between GATT and
its annexed Agreements (both the TBT and the SPS are annexed to GATT), has not been scrutinized with sufficient precision by WTO adjudicating bodies. The fact that the Panel Report Indonesia-andCertain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industy,10 which discussed in extenso the General Interpretative Note,
ultimately, was not appealed has not been helpful.
Second, assuming arguendo that the General Interpretative
Note is to be interpreted in light of the lex specialis rule, we note:
The maxim of lex specialis is not a model of clarity. Bartels notes
that the maxim dates, at the latest, from Grotius who believed
that "special provisions are ordinarily more effective than those
that are general." The maxim, however, was never reflected in
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which codifies
customary international law with respect to interpretation of
treaties. This fact alone casts doubt as to the pertinence and the
ambit of the principle.
Arguably, the principle can have value if viewed in the context of effective treaty interpretation. Viewed from this angle,
the argument runs as follows: If the same factual situation can
be submitted to two different treaty provisions that contain different tests, it is almost certain that plaintiffs will challenge measures under the relatively more stringent test for the defendant.
Hence, in as much as the jurisprudence is clear on which standard gives the plaintiff an advantage, there are good chances
that the relatively relaxed standard will fall in desuetudo. The interpreter can avoid such an outcome by carefully circumscribing
the ambit of lex specialis, which is, in the Grotian sense, the more
effective rule, and prescribing applicability of the more general
rule to the extent that there is no overlap, or more generally, as
evidence of the "spirit" of the special rule.
We should note, however, that an interpretation of the lex
specialis maxim in the light of the principle of effective treaty
interpretation has not been accepted (nor rejected) as yet in the
context of WTO case-law. Hence, the question as to which of the
SPS Agreement and Article XX of GATT prevails remains unanswered at the positive level. At the same time, lex specialis, cast in
10. Indonesia-CertainMeasures Affecting the Automobile Industry, Panel Report, WT/
DS54/AB/R Uuly 2, 1998).
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terms of effective treaty interpretation, is closely related to judicial economy, a principle of adjudication endorsed by the Appellate Body." The idea of lex specialis is also consistent with the
Appellate Body's emphasis on the duty of a treaty interpreter to
consider all the relevant words of the treaty. Where a general
standard or norm is embodied in a more specific treaty text, a
failure to consider the more specific terms would be a dereliction of this duty. On the other hand, to the extent that the more
general standard or norm is adequately embodied in the more
specific text, the principle ofjudicial economy, and more generally of effective treaty interpretation, would seem to militate
against a further application of the general norm or standard
itself, once the more specific text has been applied.
D. SPS and Article XX of GATT: An Issue Yes, But Does It Matter?
So far we established that there is no doubt that the SPS
Agreement applies to the exclusion of the TBT Agreement and
12
that it is not clear that the SPS Agreement prevails over GATT.
We submit next that the relationship between Articles III and
XX of GATT and the SPS Agreement can in practice be a nonissue in order to justify our conclusion to examine the consistency of GMO-related issues within the SPS Agreement only.
As noted above, the SPS Agreement is the only WTO instrument that imposes on WTO Members the obligation to base
their measures on scientific evidence, regardless of whether the
measures are discriminatory or violations of other basic provisions of GATT. This extra obligation in fact imposes a higher
justificatory burden on all WTO Members wishing to protect
themselves from GMOs and at the same time makes it easier for
potential complaining parties to challenge them. Hence, it
should be expected that GMO-related measures will in all likelihood be challenged as being inconsistent with the SPS Agree11. See generally United States-Import Prohibitionof Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998); Japan-Taxeson
Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS8/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996); David
Palmeter & Petros Mavroidis, The WfO Sources of Law, 92 AM.J. INT'L L. 398413 (1998).
12. In our discussion we assume of course that the complaining party has not decided to challenge a GMO-related measure only under one agreement. In such a case,
all our discussion is irrelevant since the WTO adjudicating body will have to entertain a
claim as presented to it. As we show, however, chances are that complaining parties will
choose to invoke the SPS Agreement.
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ment. Here, because the strictures appear to go significantly beyond the non-discrimination requirement at the core of what we
have called the traditional GATT/WTO paradigm, the proposition to be challenged in this Essay takes on the greatest plausibility. At the same time, it must be understood that it is up to the
complaining party to prove a violation of a WTO Agreementthus the complainant would have to at least raise a presumption
that the Member's GMO related regulations were not based on
scientific evidence. In some cases, it could be easier for the complainant to raise a presumption that the non-discrimination
principle in Article 111(4) has been violated, and then force the
defendant to justify its measures scientifically as "necessary"
within the meaning of Article XX(b). Take for instance, a ban
on GMOs originating from a defined list of countries that are
deemed not to have adequate risk management strategies in
place. Since, in such a case, a violation of Articles I and III of
GATT is obvious, by going the GATT XX route, the complainant
forces the defendant to bear thejustificatory burden for its measures. Whereas if the SPS route were taken, the complainant in
the first instance would have to show-or raise a presumptionthat the defendant's measures were not scientificallyjustified. In
an area such as GMOs, where the science is complex and there
are many uncertainties, one could not entirely dismiss the attractiveness to a complainant of a litigation strategy that requires the
exercise of justification by the defendant.
This being said, most of the trade controversy surrounding
GMO regulations is not focussed on explicitly discriminatory
regulations, but instead on general regulatory schemes, facially
applicable on equal terms to both domestic products and imports regardless of country of origin. Thus, determining under
Article 111(4) whether the measures are discriminatory, will involve evaluating subtler claims concerning elements of discrimination against imports built into facially neutral regulation.
Here, the real issue is the possibility of hidden or structurally
embedded protection. The concepts of "like" products and "less
favourable treatment" in Article 111(4), even as clarified by the
Appellate Body recently in the EC-Asbestos case, provide substantially less guidance for drawing the delicate line between innocent non-discriminatory regulation and facially neutral, but covertly and/or structurally discriminatory measures (which violate
Article 111(4)), than the detailed procedurally-oriented disci-
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plines of SPS, which require that we be able to see into the regulatory process and ascertain its non-protectionist bona fides.13 In
sum, if the adjudicator were to do a good job in dealing with
these kinds of measures under Article 111(4), she would need the
kind of tools supplied in SPS. And in turn, once she has used
these tools, the need for a separate analysis under 111(4) and XX
will be superfluous. Facially-neutral measures that pass muster
under all the explicit disciplines of SPS could not plausibly be
shown by a complainant on the balance of probabilities to be a
violation of Article 111(4). The complainant loses no legitimate
litigation advantage by the adjudicator then on the basis of the
effectiveness of treaty interpretation and judicial economy not
proceeding to the GATT claim.
These various considerations follow from the basic choice in
WTO for a complainant-driven dispute settlement process. The
WTO Agreement does not describe an institution that resembles
the avis consultatifs that a U.N. organ can request from the International Court of Justice. In such a case, there would be a shift
in the initiative and hence one could well imagine that a WTO
Member wishing to enact a GMO-restraining legislation could
very well ask questions as to its compatibility with Article XX of
the GATT.
WTO Members have of course the possibility to request a
decision by a WTO Committee. However, as the recent WTO
case-law however makes it clear,' 4 WTO adjudicating bodies are
not bound by decisions of such bodies and will proceed to their
own review independently of what has been decided in the context of such Committees. Hence, it will be of little (or no) legal
significance to WTO Members to initiate a far-fetching discussion on GMOs in the context of such Committees.
The only option available left to WTO Members would be to
request an authoritative interpretation of the Agreement or a
formal amendment (in accordance with Articles IX and X respectively of the WIG Agreement) to the effect that GMO-re13. For an analogous discussion of the relationship between Articles III and XX
and the TBT Agreement, see Robert Howse & E. Tuerk, The Impact of the WTO on Internal Regulation in the EU, in CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE EU (forthcoming 2001).
14. See generally India-QuantitativeRestrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and
IndustrialProducts, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS90/AB/R (Apr. 6, 1999); Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, Panel Report, WT/DS34/R
(May 31, 1999).
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straining legislation be judged compatible with the WTO. Such
action would pre-empt review by WTO adjudicating bodies since
the latter (agents) would have to respect the will of the former
(principals).
Such an initiative, however, has not taken place so far and
hence the relevance of the following Sections is clear since we
examine how GMO-related issues would be reviewed in the context of the SPS Agreement as interpreted so far. We should note
that in what follows we do not deal with the issue quid in case an
international agreement banning or restraining the use of
GMOs is signed outside the WTO context and its relevance for
WTO purposes is requested. So far, such a dispute (which would
in fact ask whether the WTO contract should be interpreted as
self-contained or not) has not been brought before the WTO.
However, opinions on this issue have already been expressed in
the literature.1 5
II. THE SPS A GRUMENT IN LIGHT OF THE
WTO JURISPRUDENC 1 6
A. In General
The TBT Agreement itself acknowledges that when a disputed measure qualifies as an SPS-measure, the SPS Agreement
takes precedence over the TBT. There is nothing like a comparable statement in the WTO Agreement with respect to the relationship between the SPS and Article XX of GATT (or XIV
GATS). This is particularly troublesome, since, unlike SPS, Article XX(b) on its face does not require that health-based measures blocking trade must be based on scientific evidence. In
practice, however, it would be difficult for the defendant to meet
its burden of proof that otherwise illegal GATT measures are
"necessary" for the protection of health without some resort to
scientific evidence. The fundamental difference between justification under Article XX(b) and the scientific evidence requirement in the SPS Agreement is that under Article XX in general,
the defendant bears, in the first instance, the burden of proof
for justifying its measures, but (as discussed above) only those
15. SeeJoel P. Trachtman, Decisions of the Appellate Body of the World 7rade Organization, 9 HARV. J. INT'L L. 551 (1999); Palmeter & Mavroidis, supra note 11.
16. This Section relies on HENRIK HORN & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, FLASH BACK:
WHAT WERE You THINKING WHEN ENACTING HEALTH POLICIES (2000).
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measures that have already been shown to violate some provision
of GATT.
B. Health Measures and InternationalStandards
Article 3 of the SPS Agreement deals with the relationship
between domestic SPS regulations and international standards.
There is a general obligation to base domestic SPS measures on
international standards. This is subject to a right to deviate from
international standards where the result is a higher level of protection. This right to deviate is in turn conditioned on the requirements of scientific risk assessment in the regulatory process
that are detailed in Article 5 of SPS. In addition to measures
based on international standards and those that deviate from international standards in accordance with 3.3 in order to achieve
a higher level of protection, a third category is measures that
"conform to" international standards. In the case of the last category, there is a presumption that the measure at hand is compatible with the WTO, including that it could be justified under
Article XX of GATT.17 As the Appellate Body noted in Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Productsi" ("Hormones"), "conformity"
suggests a closer fit than "based on," measures may take international standards as their point of departure, but reflect considerable variation at the level of detail, and this is consistent with
their being "based on" international standards.
In sum, Article 3 of the SPS gives an incentive to states to
comply with international standards but it should not be
equated to an obligation to follow them.
The rest of the Essay deals with the case where a WTO Member has decided to seek a higher level of protection than that
provided by existing international standards, thereby making it
clear that the strictures of Article 5 of the SPS apply.
III. NATIONAL HEALTH STANDARDS
A domestic measure adopted under the SPS must be based
on risk assessment, taking into account scientific evidence.
17. The text of Article 3.2 of the SPS does not make it clear whether the presumption established is an irrebutable one.
18. European Communities-Measures ConcerningMeat and Meat Products (Hormones),
Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).

328

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 24:317

Moreover, it must be non-discriminatory, 9 in the sense that it
will be applicable in a neutral manner and must also be part of a
coherent and consistent policy. Some of the key issues (risk, risk
assessment, scientific evidence, non-discrimination, and coherence) have been already interpreted in the WTO case law. We
take them in turn.
A. Must Be Based on a Risk Assessment (Article 5.1 of the SPS)
Logically, for the term "risk assessment" to be interpreted,
one must first have a clear idea about what the term "risk" might
mean. It is impossible to speak of a "risk-free" situation, for
every factual situation might entail a certain level of risk. The
example of incidence of lead in water (that is, how much lead in
how much water is dangerous for a policy prohibiting lead in
water to be addressing a risk) illustrates this point.
The Hormones Appellate Body report acknowledged this
point (upholding a previous finding by a panel) when it stated
that:
[T]he Panel opposes a requirement of an "identifiable risk"
to the uncertainty that theoretically always remains since science can never provide absolute certainty that a given substance will not ever have adverse health effects. We agree with
the Panel that this theoretical uncertainty is not the kind of
risk which, under Article 5.1, is to be assessed. 9°
However, the Appellate Body also opines that:
To the extent that the Panel purported to require a risk assessment to establish a minimum magnitude of risk, we must
note that imposition of such quantitative requirement finds
21
no basis in the SPS Agreement.
We can conclude from the above that a "risk" in the sense of
Article 5.1 of the SPS must be an ascertainable risk and not the
mere hypothetical or abstract possibility of risk, which is inherent in everyday life precisely because of the limits of human
19. This question must be distinguished from the question whether a demonstration of discrimination is a necessary precondition for invoking the SPS Agreement. It is
clear by now that such is not the case, that is, the SPS Agreement comes into play
independently whether discrimination has previously been shown.
20. European Communities-Measures ConcerningMeat and Meat Products (Hormones),
Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
21. Id.
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knowledge. Risk cannot simply be asserted in this general way.
There must be some empirical investigation of specific risks
This point has been re-emphasized by the Appellate Body in subsequent case law:
As stated in our Report in European Communities-Hormones, the risk evaluated in a risk assessment must be an ascertainable risk; theoretical uncertainty is "not2 2the kind of
risk which, under Article 5.1, is to be assessed.
We can conclude from the above that a risk in accordance
with Article 5.1 of the SPS must be an ascertainable risk. However, at the same time, once there is empirical evidence of risk, it
is perfectly legitimate for a Member to seek to reduce the risk so
ascertained to zero. Moreover, the notion of ascertainable risk
does not establish some minimum threshold concerning the
level of uncertainty or error that is tolerable in a finding of risk.
It merely indicates that such a finding must be based on investigation consistent with scientific principles, rather than mere untested hypothesis.
Now that we have established what "risk" is, we turn to the
notion of risk assessment. The Hormones Panel Report made a
distinction between risk assessment and risk management. We
should note first that the term "risk assessment" is already defined in the SPS Agreement. Annex A contains the following
definition:
The evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or
spread of a pest or disease within the territory of an importing Member according to the sanitary or phytosanitary measures which might be applied, and of the associated potential
biological and economic consequences; or the evaluation of
the potential for adverse effects on human or animal health
arising from the presence of additives, contaminants, toxins
organisms in food, beverages or feedor disease-causing
23
stuffs.

The Hormones Panel Report understood this term as follows:
"an assessment of risk is, at least for risks to human life or health,
22. Australia-Measures Affecting Impartation of Salmon, Report of the Appellate
Body, WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998) (quoting from European Communities-Measures
ConcerningMeat and Meat Products (Hormones), Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS26/
AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
23. SPS Agreement, Annex A.
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a scientific examination of data and factual studies; it is not a policy exercise involving social value judgments made by political
24
bodies.
The panel distinguishes from "risk assessment," as defined
above, "risk management," which is the second step in a decision
by a WTO Member to enact an SPS measure. That is, after a risk
assessment has been carried through, and logically provided that
we are in presence of an ascertainable risk as defined above,
WTO Members can choose their appropriate level of sanitary or
phytosanitary protection. 25 As the panel implies, WTO Members-provided that they respect the disciplines laid out in Article 5.4-5.6 of the SPS-are free to choose the level of protection
that seems appropriate to them. This finding is in line with the
finding of the Appellate Body that WTO members can legitimately pursue a zero risk-policy. The notion of risk assessment
was further clarified in the Appellate Body Report on Measures
Affecting Importation of Salmon.26 There, in an often quoted subsequent case-law passage, the Appellate Body report holds for the
following proposition:
[W] e consider that.., a risk assessment within the meaning
of Article 5.1 must:
(1) identify the diseases whose entry, establishment or spread
a Member wants to prevent within its territory, as well as
the potential biological and economic consequences associated with the entry, establishment or spread of these
diseases;
(2) evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of
these diseases, as well as the associated potential biological and economic consequences; and
(3) evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread
accordingto the SPS measures which might be
of these diseases
27
applied."

So, according to this definition, a WTO Member must pro24. European Communities-Measures ConcerningMeat and Meat Products (Hormones),
Complaint by the United States, Report of the Panel, WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18,
1997).
25. Surprisingly, the Panel Report does not reflect that the term "appropriate level
of sanitary or phytosanitary protection" has already been interpreted in Annex A in a
way that essentially condones regulatory diversity.
26. See Australia-MeasuresAffecting Importation of Salmon, Report of the Appellate
Body, WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998).
27. Id. § 121 (emphasis added).
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vide evidence probative of causal relationship between the SPS
measure it is about to enact and the disease it wants to address,
in the sense that its measure will be the antidote to the identified
risks. Moreover, there must be a likelihood of entry of the identified disease, which in turn must be evaluated. The outcome of
such evaluation amounts to risk assessment. Likelihood, as the
Appellate Body notes, is more than a mere possibility. The Hormones Appellate Body Report notes in this respect: "The ordinary meaning of 'potential' relates to 'possibility' and is different
from the ordinary meaning of 'probability.' 'Probability' implies
a higher degree or a threshold of potentiality or possibility."2 8
The Salmon Appellate Body report confirmed: "[I] t is not
sufficient that a risk assessment conclude that there is a possibility
of entry, establishment or spread of diseases and associated biological and economic consequences. '"29
However, the Appellate Body did not endorse the Panel's
misuse of the statistical concept of probability. It merely reverted to the notion, developed in Hormones, that a risk must be
ascertained and defined, rather than being stated in vague terms
as a simply possibility-something, that like all events in a underdetermined universe, could occur. Hence, we can conclude
that, in the relevant Appellate Body case-law, a risk assessment is
a process whereby the likelihood of entry of a disease will be
ascertained.
Now, for an SPS measure to be WTO-compatible it must be
based on a risk assessment. What exactly the words "based on"
mean formed the partial subject-matter of the Hormones litigation. Two aspects of the term have been interpreted: the time
dimension and the question of overlap between the SPS measure
enacted and the risk assessment. We take each issue in turn.
The Panel Report in the Hormones litigation stands for the
proposition that "the Member imposing a sanitary measure
needs to submit evidence that at least it actually took into account
a risk assessment when it enacted or maintained its sanitary measure in order for that measure to be considered as based on a risk
assessment. "30
28. Id. § 184.
29. Id. § 123.
30. European Communities-Measures ConcerningMeat and Meat Products (Hormones),
Complaint by the United States, Report of the Panel, WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18,
1997).
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Hence, according to this view, scientific evidence that did
not serve as the basis for the enactment of the measure can only
be taken into account if it is shown that the WTO Member somehow considered it either when they first enacted the measure or
31
when they re-examined it.
The Appellate Body reversed the Panel's findings in this respect and ruled that scientific evidence can be submitted at a
later stage as well. The operative consequence of this ruling is
that a WTO Member can, for the first time, submit that it based a
measure on a risk assessment when challenged before a WTO
adjudicating body.3 2 Hence, according to the prevailing view, a
WTO Member can lawfully enact a measure even when it cannot
offer a basis of risk assessment at the moment of enactment of
such measure, provided that a basis can be offered, if and when
the measure is challenged before a VTO adjudicating body.
The Hormones Appellate Body Report, reversing the Panel
Report in this respect, made it clear that "based on" should not
be understood to mean that the SPS measure must conform absolutely to the risk assessment. A certain margin of discretion in
favour of the WTO Member enacting legislation must be acknowledged. The relevant passage reads: "[a] measure, however, based on the same standard might not conform to that
standard, as where only some, not all, of the elements of the
standard are incorporated into the measure. 3
Both the Panel and the Appellate Body Report referred to
the use of international standards. Hence, it is clear that national SPS measures based on international standards can pass
the test of WTO legality, even if they reflect only elements of the
international standard.
B. A Risk Assessment Shall Take Into Account Scientific Evidence
(Article 5.2 of the SPS)
The SPS Agreement 34 imposes on all WTO Members con31. Id. § 8.115.
32. See European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
33. Id. § 163.
34. See generally Joost Pauwelyn, The WFO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
(SPS) as Applied in the First Three SPS Disputes, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 641 (1999) (providing
account of all SPS-related cases treated so far by WTO Appellate Body); Robert Howse,
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cerned an obligation to base their measures on scientific evidence. In this respect, Article 2.2 of the SPS reads:
Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health, is based on scientific principles
and is not maintained without scientific evidence, except as
provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5.
What exactly is scientific evidence?
The Hormones Panel Report did not discuss the issue in
great detail. In § 8.130 of the Report though, we note that general information not relating specifically to the subject matter
under discussion might be disregarded as impertinent. Hence,
without explaining exactly which level of specificity is necessary
for an opinion to qualify as scientific evidence, the panel report
argues in favour of specificity-threshold.
The Hormones Appellate Body report in an often-cited passage tackles another angle with respect to what might constitute
scientific evidence. It states:
Article 5.1 does not require that the risk assessment must necessarily embody only the view of a majority of the relevant
scientific community. In some cases, the very existence of divergent views presented by qualified scientists who have investigated the particular issue at hand may indicate a state of
scientific uncertainty. Sometimes a divergence may indicate a
roughly equal balance of scientific opinion, which may itself
be a form of scientific uncertainty. In most cases, responsible
and representative governments tend to base their legislative
and administrative measures on "mainstream" scientific opinion. In other cases, equally responsible and representative
governments may act in good faith on the basis of what, at a
given time, may be a divergent opinion coming from quali35
fied and respected sources.
Thus, minority scientific opinions by and large suffice for a
WTO Member to have met its burden under the SPS.
Further light on the meaning of scientific evidence is provided, indirectly, by the Appellate Body, when examining an oral
Democracy, Science and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at the WTO, 98 U. MICH. L.R.
2329 (2000) (discussing all related cases).
35. European Communities-Measures ConcerningMeat and Meat Products (Hormones),
Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
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statement by an expert (Dr. Lucier) invited to testify before it,
the Appellate Body notes:
[T] his opinion by Dr. Lucier does not purport to be the result of scientific studies carried out by him or under his supervision focusing specifically on residues of hormones in meat
from cattle fattened with such hormones. Accordingly, it appears that the single divergent opinion expressed by Dr. Lucier is not reasonably sufficient to overturn the contrary conclusions reached in the scientific studies referred to by the
European Communities that relate specifically to residues of
hormones had
the hormones in meat from cattle to which
36
been administered for growth promotion.
It is unclear why the Appellate Body dismissed the opinion
of the expert. The term "accordingly" used by the Appellate
Body seems to suggest that the decisive criterion for it to disregard the expressed opinion was the fact that Dr. Lucier merely
offered an oral explanation without having previously conducted
research on the issue. If this is the case, then the Appellate Body
most likely rejected the opinion expressed because it did not
meet its self-imposed (but not precise) scientific evidence-threshold. In such a case, the Appellate Body implicitly accepts that
some "minimum methodological requirements" (albeit undefined so far) must be there for an opinion to have the status of
scientific evidence. And on the other hand, that if this is the
case, a minority opinion, provided that it meets standard mentioned above, suffices for a WTO Member to base on it its health
policy. But these requirements, rather than residing in some
conception of orthodox or mainstream contemporary natural
science, denote the broader understanding of science as reasoned inquiry or investigation-a notion reflected in the broadness of meaning of the word for "science" in other European
languages, for example Wissenschaft in German and Nauke in
Russian. This is reflected in the following definition of the notion of science in the Hormones Appellate Body Report: a process
characterized by systematic, disciplined and objective enquiry
and analysis, that is, a mode of studying and sorting out facts and
opinions.""

36. Id. § 198.
37. Id. § 187.
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C. What Can be Taken Into Account Beyond Scientific Evidence
(Article 5.2 of the SPS)
Article 5.2 of the SPS lists the factors to be taken into account when assessing risk. It mentions available scientific evidence; relevant processes and production methods; relevant inspection, sampling, and testing methods; prevalence of specific
diseases and pests; existence of pest- or disease- free areas; relevant ecological and environmental conditions; and quarantine
or other treatment.
In a notorious passage in its Hormones Report, the Appellate
Body interpreted the objective function of the list:
[T]o the extent that the Panel purports to exclude from the
scope of a risk assessment in the sense of Article 5.1, all matters not susceptible of quantitative analysis by the empirical or

experimental laboratory methods commonly associated with
the physical sciences, we believe that the Panel is in error.
Some of the kinds of factors listed in Article 5.2 such as "relevant processes and production methods" and "relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods" are not necessarily
or wholly susceptible of investigation according to laboratory
methods of, for example, biochemistry or pharmacology.

Furthermore, there is nothing to indicate that the listing of
factors that may be taken into account in a risk assessment of

Article 5.2 was intended to be a closed list. It is essential to
bear in mind that the risk that is to be evaluated in a risk
assessment under Article 5.1 is not only risk ascertainable in a
science laboratory operating under strictly controlled conditions, but also risk in human societies as they actually exist, in
other words, the actual potential for adverse effects on
human health in the real world where people live and work
38
and die.

Hence, it seems that the Appellate Body in this passage, on

the one hand, opts for a deferential posture to national regulators-by allowing WTO Members to view the factors mentioned
in the list from the perspective of democratic regulation, not
necessarily from that of laboratory science. On the other hand,
the Appellate Body also adopts the position that the list of Article 5.2 of the SPS is not an exhaustive list and that other factors
not mentioned in the list could eventually become integral parts
38. Id.
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of the totality of factors that can be taken into account when a
WTO Member assesses a risk.
At this stage, the Appellate Body has not yet elaborated on
which other factors can be taken into account (beyond those
mentioned in Article 5.2 of the SPS) or as to how the factors
mentioned can, in practice, be evaluated from a non-scientific
perspective. However, the Appellate Body may well have been
wise not to prioritise the notion of "science" or the "scientific."
The kinds of factors that related to a "scientific" assessment of
risk will evolve as science evolves and also cannot be considered
in abstraction apart from the kind of risk at issue the kind of
public policy decision to which the risk assessment is directed.
D. Economic Factors Can be Taken Into Account When Assessing the
Risk and Determining the Appropriate Level of Protection
(Article 5.3 of the SPS)
This Article has not been interpreted so far.
E. When Stating Their Objective, WTO Members Must Seek to
Minimize Negative Trade Effects (Article 5.4 of the SPS)
None of the Appellate Body reports contain in their ratio
decidendi reference to Article 5.4 of the SPS. However, an explicit reference to this Article is found in the Hormones Panel
Report, which in pertinent part reads:
Guided by the wording of Article 5.4, in particular the words
"should" (not "shall") and "objective," we consider that this

provision of the SPS Agreement does not impose an obligation. However, this objective of minimizing trade effects has
nonetheless to be taken into account in the interpretation of
other provisions of the SPS Agreement.3 9
F. WTO Adjudicating Bodies Will Essentially Review the Means and
Not the End (Article 5.6 SPS)
Article 5.6 of the SPS is closely related to Article 5.4 of the
SPS. The latter refers to the objective sought by WTO Members,
whereas the former addresses the means applied in order to
39. European Communities-Measures ConcerningMeat and Meat Products (Hormones),
Complaint by the United States, Report of the Panel, WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18,
1997).
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reach the stated objective. As mentioned above, WTO adjudicating bodies will not question the level of the objective sought; all
they can do is examine whether the means used are the least
restrictive means that a WTO Member could use to reach its objective.
The logical link between means and ends prejudges the
standard of review to be applied by WTO adjudicating bodies: If
the goal is to reduce risk to zero, any precaution that makes
some additional marginal contribution to bringing the risk
closer to zero will, in principle, be necessary. Hence, adjudicating bodies will have less leeway to examine whether the means
used are indeed the least restrictive option than in a case where
the objective sought is not as inflexible as a zero risk-policy. All
these issues have already been explored in WTO case-law.
With respect to the first, the Salmon Appellate Body decision
holds that:
The determination of the appropriate level of protection, a
notion defined in paragraph 5 of Annex A, as "the level of
protection deemed appropriate by the Member establishing a
sanitary... measure" is a prerogative of the Member and not
The "appropriate
of the panel or of the Appellate Body....
level of protection" established by a Member and the "SPS
measure" have to be clearly distinguished. They are not one
and the same thing. The first is an objective, the second is an
instrument chosen to attain or implement that objective.4"
The closely related situation where a WTO member has enacted an SPS measure but has not clearly identified the appropriate level of protection sought, was addressed in the same report which relevantly reads:
[W]e believe that in cases where a Member does not determine its appropriate level of protection, or does so with insufficient precision, the appropriate level of protection may be
established by panels on the basis of the level of protection
reflected in the SPS measure actually applied. Otherwise, a
Member's failure to comply with the implicit obligation to determine its appropriate level of protection-with sufficient
precision-would allow it to escape from its obligations under
this Agreement and, in particular, its obligations under Arti40. Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, Report of the Appellate
Body, WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998).
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cles 5.5 and 5.6. 4 '
Second, there is the issue of applying the appropriate test
when reviewing the means used to reach the sought objective.
Again, the Salmon Appellate Body report contains a relevant passage: "What is required under Article 5.6 is an examination of
whether possible alternative SPS measures meet the appropriate
level of protection as determined by the Member concerned."4 2
And later, upholding the Panel's findings in this respect the
Appellate Body provides the test to be used in order to examine
whether a means is indeed the least restrictive means to reach
the ends sought:
The three elements of this test under Article 5.6 are that
there is an SPS measure which: (1) is reasonably available
taking into account technical and economic feasibility; (2)
achieves the Member's appropriate level of sanitary or
phytosanitary protection; and (3) is significantly less restrictive to trade than the SPS measure contested. These three
elements are cumulative in the sense that, to establish inconsistency with Article 5.6, all of them have to be met. If any of
these elements are not proven, the measure in dispute would
be consistent with Article 5.6. Thus, if there is no alternative
measure available, taking into account technical and economic feasibility, or if the alternative measure does not
achieve the Member's appropriate level of sanitary or
phytosanitary protection, or if it is not significantly less traderestrictive, the measure in dispute would be consistent with
Article 5.6.
In subsequent case-law, the Appellate Body confirmed this finding.

44

During the Panel proceedings on Measures Affecting Agriculthe United
tural Products/Varietals ("Varietals Panel Report"),
States advanced the argument that Japan could reach its stated
objective by using another less restrictive means. The Panel examined and rejected the U.S. argument, and the Appellate Body
41. Id. § 207.
42. Id. § 204.
43. Id. § 194 (emphasis added).
44. See Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, Report of the Appellate
Body, WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 22 1999).
45. See Japan-MeasuresAffecting Agricultural Products, Panel Report, WT/DS76/R
(Oct. 27, 1998).
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upheld the result.4 6
It is clear that if presented with evidence by a party to the
dispute that a means chosen by a WTO Member to reach a
health objective is not the least restrictive one, WTO adjudicating bodies will have to entertain the argument and decide accordingly. But in case no argument is presented, or in case the
presented argument is not convincing, can WTO adjudicating
bodies still address questions to the parties in order to make up
their mind on the degree of restrictiveness of a particular measure?
The WTO case-law provides some answers in this respect.
We treat them though when we address the burden of proof issue.
G. When Adopting National Standards, WTO Members Must be
Consistent (Article 5.5 of the SPS)
The Hormones Appellate Body acknowledges that "the objective of Article 5.5 is formulated as the 'achieving [of] consistency
in the application of the concept of appropriate level of sanitary
or phytosanitary protection."' 4 7
This however should not be equated to a declaration in favour of always consistent SPS policies over time. The same report a few lines later explains:
[W]e agree with the Panel's view that the statement of that
goal does not establish a legal obligation of consistency of appropriate levels of protection. We think, too, that the goal set
is not absolute or perfect consistency, since governments establish their appropriate levels of protection frequently on an
ad hoc basis and over time, as different risks present themselves at different times. It is only arbitrary or unjustifiable
inconsistencies that are to be avoided.4 8
According to the same report, three elements must be cumulatively demonstrated for a violation of Article 5.5 SPS to exist:
The first element is that the Member imposing the measure
46. See Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, Report of the Appellate
Body, WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 22, 1999).
47. European Communities-Measures ConcerningMeat and Meat Products (Hormones),
Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
48. Id.
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complained of has adopted its own appropriate levels of sanitary protection against risks to human life or health in several
different situations. The second element to be shown is that
those levels of protection exhibit arbitrary or unjustifiable differences ('distinctions' in the language of Article 5.5) in their
treatment of different situations. The last element requires
that the arbitrary or unjustifiable differences result in discrimination or a disguised restriction of international trade. We
understand the last element to be referring to the measure
embodying or implementing a particular level of protection
as resulting, in its application, in discrimination or in a disguised restriction on international trade... We consider the
above three elements of Article 5.5 to be cumulative in nature; all of them must be demonstrated to be present if violation of Article 5.5 is to be found. In particular, both the second and third elements must be found.4 9
According to the Hormones Appellate Body report, despite
the fact that the European Community prohibited the use of
some hormones in beef production, it authorised others for pig
production. This was held compatible with Article 5.5 of the
SPS, even though this difference of treatment was found to be
arbitrary or unjustifiable. The fact of the matter was that, in the
Appellate Body's view, the third element of its three-prong test
was not met. The motivation of the Appellate Body is found in
§ 245 of the Report:
We do not attribute the same importance as the Panel to the
supposed multiple objectives of the European Communities
in enacting the EC Directives that set forth the EC measures
at issue. The documentation that preceded or accompanied
the enactment of the prohibition of the use of hormones for
growth promotion and that formed part of the record of the
Panel makes clear the depth and extent of the anxieties experiencing within the European Communities concerning
the results of the general scientific studies (showing the carcinogenicity of hormones), the dangers of abuse (highlighted
by scandals relating to black-marketing and smuggling of prohibited veterinary drugs in the European Communities) of
hormones and other substances used for growth promotion
and the intense concern of consumers within the European
Communities over the quality and drug-free character of the
49. Id. §§ 214-15.
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meat available in its internal market. 50
The Salmon Appellate Body Report applies the same threeprong test when it examines the compatibility of an Australian
measure with Article 5.5 of the SPS. 51 It further confirms the
finding of the Hormones Appellate Body Report that differences
in level of protection are a "warning signal" that the implementing measure in its application might be a discriminatory measure. 5 1 It thus confirms that different levels of protection as such
are not enough to satisfy the third element of the three-prong
test. To this effect, they are a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition.
The Salmon Appellate Body then took note of the fact that
the Panel had identified two more warning signals 53 and three
additional factors.5 4

The Appellate Body agreed with Australia that the first additional factor was a mere restatement of the first warning signal
and hence should not be taken into account.5 5 It accepts the
remaining part of the Panel's analysis and concludes as follows:
We have only reversed the Panel's finding on the first "additional factor." We consider, however, that this reversal does
not affect the validity of the Panel's conclusion in paragraph
8.159 of its Report, that the "warning signals" and "other factors," considered cumulatively, lead to the conclusion that
the distinctions in the level of protection imposed by Australia result in a disguised restriction on international trade.56
At first glance, a discrepancy appears to exist between the
two reports although the same standard was applied. There are
two distinguishing factors between the two cases, however, that
50. Id. § 245.
51. See Australia-MeasuresAffecting Importation of Salmon, Report of the Appellate
Body, 1v/DS18/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998).
52. See Eurogpean Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
53. See Australia-MeasuresAffecting Importation of Salmon, Report of the Appellate
Body, WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998) (citing substantial difference in levels of protection and inconsistency of SPS measure at hand with Article 5.1 SPS).
54. Id. §§ 167-74 (citing discrimination between salmon and herring used as bait,
substantial but unexplained change in conclusion between two Reports recommending
said SPS measures, and the absence of controls on internal movement of salmon products within Australia).
55. Id. § 169.
56. Id. § 177.
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probably explain the difference in the outcome: First, § 8.32 of
the Salmon Panel Report states that "the protection of human
life or health is not at issue in this dispute." Second, the anxieties of consumers mentioned in the Hormones Appellate Body report were reflected in the EC Directive (in its preamble) but not
at all in Australian SPS. Indeed this could hardly be the case
since, as Australia admitted, human life or health was not an issue. It appears hence, that the Appellate Body is leaning towards a more deferential standard when human life or health is
at stake.57
H. National Standards Can be Adopted Even in Absence of Scientific
Evidence (Article 5.7 of the SPS)
Article 5.7 of the SPS reflects the "precautionary" principle,
which allows WTO Members to take SPS measures even in absence of scientific evidence. Absence of scientific evidence is not
tantamount to a statement that WTO Members are completely
unconstrained when enacting SPS measures under Article 5.7 of
the SPS. The Varietals Appellate Body Report explains that:
[A] Member may provisionally adopt an SPS measure if this
measure is: (1) imposed in respect of a situation where "relevant scientific information is insufficient"; and (2) adopted
"on the basis of available pertinent information." Pursuant to
the second sentence of Article 5.7, such a provisional measure may not be maintained unless the Member which
adopted the measure: (1) "seek[s] to obtain the additional
information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk"
and (2) "review the ... measure accordingly within a reasona-

ble period of time." These four requirements are clearly cumulative in nature and are equally important for the purpose
of determining consistency with this provision. Whenever one
of these four conditions is not met, the measure at issue is
inconsistent with Article 5.7.5 s
Since the Panel did not examine the two elements appearing in the first sentence of Article 5.7 of the SPS and based its
conclusions only on the elements appearing in the second sen57. See generally Robert Howse, Democracy, Science and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on
Trial at the WJ'O, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2329 (2000) (forthcoming).
58. Japan-MeasuresAffecting Agricultural Products, Report of the Appellate Body,

WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 22, 1999).
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tence, the Appellate Body did not have the opportunity to interpret the first sentence.
With respect to the elements appearing in the second sentence, the Appellate Body observed:
Article 5.7 states that the additional information is to be
sought in order to allow the Member to conduct "a more objective assessment of risk." Therefore, the information sought
must be germane to conducting such a risk assessment, i.e.,
the evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or
spread of, in casu, a pest, according to the SPS measures
which might be applied. 5 9
And later:
[W]hat constitutes a "reasonable period of time" has to be
established on a case-by-case basis and depends on the specific circumstances of each case, including the difficulty of obtaining the additional information necessary for the review
and the characteristics of the provisional SPS measure. In the
present case, the Panel found that collecting the necessary
additional information would be relatively easy. Although the
obligation "to review" the varietal testing requirement has
only been in existence since 1 January 1995, we agree with the
testing requirePanel that Japan has not reviewed its varietal
60
ment "within a reasonable period of time".
What emerges from case-law, however, is that the additional
information must be pertinent and that in case it is relatively
easy for a WTO Member to collect the additional necessary information, such collection must have taken place within four
years (since the Appellate Body Report was issued on February
22, 1999).
We are still in the dark, however, as to the interpretation of
the term "available pertinent information" as it appears in the
first sentence of Article 5.7 of the SPS. This term is perhaps the
cornerstone of the whole Article: Since it is by definition less
authoritative than scientific evidence, we need to know how
much less is necessary for the "precautionary" principle to be
invoked in the first place.

59. Id. § 92.
60. Id. § 93 (emphasis added).
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I. To Prove SPS Consistency: Allocation of Burden of Proof to the
Parties and the Extent of Control by WTO
Adjudicating Bodies
The WTO (like most public international law bodies) contains a de-centralized system of enforcement. This means,
among other things, that, in principle, parties to a dispute will
carry the burden of proof for their arguments. On the other
hand, WTO adjudicating bodies administer the process and are
obliged, under Article 11 of the DSU, to conduct an objective
assessment of the dispute before them. An issue intimately connected with the allocation of burden of proof is the question
whether WTO adjudicating bodies can move away from claims
presented to them by the parties to a dispute in order to honour
their commitment to provide an objective assessment. In other
words the question arises as to whether WTO adjudicating bodies have to provide an objective assessment within what has been
submitted by the parties to the dispute or, conversely, whether in
order to provide an objective assessment they can move to arguments and claims not submitted by the parties?
The role of panels in seeking expert evidence is laid out in a
rudimentary form in Article 13 of the DSU and Article 11.2 of
the SPS, which essentially enable WTO adjudicating bodies to
look for outside expertise in order to decide SPS-related cases.
However, none of the texts mentioned makes it clear whether
such expertise should be confined to the claims and arguments
as presented by parties to the dispute or whether it can extend to
issues not covered by the parties.
Hence, there is an intimate relationship between allocation
of the burden of proof and the extent of control by WTO adjudicating bodies. We take each issue in turn.
The Hormones Appellate Body report establishes the rule to
be followed when allocating the burden of proof:
The initial burden lies on the complaining party, which must
establish a prima facie case of inconsistency with a particular
provision of the SPS Agreement on the part of the defending
party, or more precisely, of its SPS measure or measure complained about. When the primafacie case is made, the burden
of proof moves to the defending party, which must in turn
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61
counter or refute the claimed inconsistency.

Hence, it is clear that there is nothing like an ex ante control
of consistency of SPS measures. Such measures are presumed to
be consistent with the WTO unless challenged (and proven to be
inconsistent) before a WTO adjudicating body.
The issue presented itself once again in the context of the
Varietals litigation. This time, however, with a slight "twist" that
actually bridges the gap between burden of proof and extent of
control by WTO adjudicating bodies, the United States claimed
that Japan did not use the least restrictive option to reach its
objective. 62 According to the U.S. argument, Japan should have
conducted a "testing by product" in order to ensure that its regulatory objective be met. The Panel sought advice from experts to
see if Japan indeed had not chosen the least restrictive option. It
did so, however, not with respect to "testing by product," as the
United States had argued, but with respect to "sorption levels"another method used to reach Japan's revealed preference,
which had not been argued by the United States. Hence, the
question arose whether the Panel had exceeded the limits of its
power by seeking expertise to establish that another (potentially) less restrictive method, not argued by the complaining
party, could have helped Japan reach its objective. The Appellate Body dealt with the issue in the following manner: "[w]e
note that the Panel explicitly stated that the United States, as
complaining party, did not specifically argue that the 'determination of sorption levels' met any of the three elements under Article 5.6."63 And later:

Article 13 of the DSU allows a panel to seek information from
any relevant source and to consult individual experts or expert bodies to obtain their opinion on certain aspects of the
matter before it. In our Report ... we noted the "comprehensive nature" of this authority.., to enable a panel to discharge its duty imposed by Article 11 of the DSU.....6

And then:
61. European Communities-Measures ConcerningMeat and Meat Products (Hormones),
Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
62. See Japan-MeasuresAffecting Agricultural Products, Panel Report, WT/DS76/R
(Oct. 27, 1998).
63. Japan-MeasuresAffecting Agricultural Products, Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 22, 1999)
64. Id. § 127.
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[W] e note that the present dispute is a dispute under the SPS
Agreement. Article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement explicitly instructs
panels in disputes under this Agreement involving scientific

and technical issues to "seek advice from experts. '"65
And finally:
Article 13 of the DSU and Article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement
suggest that panels have a significant investigative authority.
However, this authority cannot be used by a panel to rule in
favour of a complaining party which has not established a
primafacie case of inconsistency based on specific legal claims
asserted by it. A panel is entitled to seek information and
advice from experts and from any other relevant source it
chooses, pursuant to Article 13 of the DSU and, in an SPS
case, Article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement, to help it to understand and evaluate the evidence submitted and the arguments made by the parties, but not to make the case for the
66
complaining party.

In a nutshell: The Panel at hand could have sought expertise to ensure that the U.S. argument with respect to "testing by
product" was indeed correct but could not have done so with
respect to "sorption levels" since the complaining party-the
United States-did not make a specific argument to this effect.
This means that panels have unlimited discretion to seek outside
expertise in order to determine whether a prima facie case has
been made. This point was further underlined in the IndiaQuantitativeRestrictions case where the Appellate Body dealt with
the question whether the Panel erred in seeking IMF (International Monetary Fund) expertise when examining whether the
complaining party had indeed made a prima facie case. There,
the Appellate Body held:
We do not interpret the above statement as requiring the
panel to conclude that a prima facie case is made before it
considers the views of the IMF or any other experts that it

consults. Such consideration may be useful 67
in order to determine whether a prima facie has been made.
Thus, a party challenging an SPS measure carries the burden of proof to show that the measure at hand is inconsistent
65. Id. § 128.
66. Id. § 129.
67. See India-QuantitativeRestrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial
Products, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS90/AB/R (Apr. 6, 1999).
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with the treaty. WTO adjudicating bodies can seek expertise to
persuade themselves about the well-foundedness of the arguments presented by the parties to the dispute but cannot move
to arguments not presented by the parties. That is, to use the
cited Varietals litigation as example, VWTO adjudicating bodies
can seek expertise to examine the well-foundedness of the U.S.
argument with respect to "testing by product." If they conclude
that the U.S. argument is not correct, they cannot move on to
examine whether another method (the 'sorption levels') is indeed less restrictive than the one chosen by Japan, even if they
know that this is the case.
J. The Role of the Expert Witness in the Quest for the Truth
Article 13 of the DSU and Article 11.2 of the SPS allow
WTO adjudicating bodies to select experts in consultation with
the parties to the dispute. In the context of SPS, seeking outside
expertise is a routine experience. This is so because of the issues
involved: panelists are rarely accustomed to addressing scientific
issues.
In the Hormones litigation, the panel first asked parties to
the dispute to name one expert each. It then named two experts
(from a list prepared by the Codex Commission and the International Agency for Research on Cancer) and one additional expert in the area of carcinogenic effects of hormones.6" The European Community appealed the fact that one of the experts was
national of a party or third party and had links with the pharmaceutical industry. The Appellate Body, distinguishing the selection of expert witnesses in the context of SPS from expert review
groups (Appendix 4 of the DSU), dismissed the EC argument
and held that: "[o] nce the panel has decided to request the
opinion of individual scientific experts, there is no legal obstacle
to the panel drawing up, in consultation with the parties to the
dispute, ad hoc rules for those particular proceedings."6 9
In the Salmon case, the Panel chose four experts after con68. See European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Complaint by the United States, Report of the Panel, WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug.
18, 1997).
69. European Communities-Measures ConcerningMeat and Meat Products (Hormones),
Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
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sultations with the Office International des Epizooties ("OIE"). 7 °
Finally, in the Varietals dispute, the Panel chose three experts
of the Internaafter soliciting suggestions from the Secretariat
7
tional Plant Protection Convention ("IPCC"). '
Panels, it appears, will-in consultation with the parties to
the dispute-seek expertise from outside sources following suggestions by the organizations mentioned in the SPS Agreement
(i.e., OIE, IPCC, Codex). In the Hormones litigation, the parties
to the dispute were given the opportunity to name one expert
each.
In these cases the panels have exhibited some confusion
about the appropriate role of scientific expertise. For example, in the Salmon case they asked laboratory natural scientists
questions that related to the costs and benefits of regulatory
alternatives, which bears on matters of politics and economics. It should not be presumed that the relevant expertise in
SPS cases will always be that of natural scientists-following
on the remarks of the Appellate Body in Hormones case about
the real world in which people live and die, expertise concerning the effectiveness and consequences-social and economic, or even cultural-of particular forms of risk management and regulatory intervention may be appropriate.
K. A PartialConclusion
The case law so far on SPS can be reduced to the following
set of propositions:
" WTO Members can enact definitive SPS measures provided
that a risk assessment has taken place.
* WTO Members can also enact provisional SPS measures in
the absence of a risk assessment in the light of available
pertinent information.
" When WTO Members enact definitive SPS measures, their
risk assessment must be based on scientific evidence.
* For evidence to be considered scientific, some minimum
requirements of procedural or methodological rigour must
be met.
* SPS measures can be enacted following a risk assessment
70. See Australia-MeasuresAffecting Importation of Salmon, Report of the Appellate
Body, MWT/DS18/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998).
71. Id.
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based on minority scientific opinions, including views from
"non-mainstream" science.
" The scientific evidence does not have to be provided at the
moment an SPS measure is enacted; however, it must be
provided when an SPS measure is challenged before a
WTO panel.
" The scientific evidence supplied must support the view that
there is more than a mere abstract or hypothetical possibility of the risk materializing unless the SPS measure at hand
is enacted; there must be some actual empirical investigation or inquiry into risk.
" WTO Members are free to set the level of risk they are willing to undertake at any level they deem appropriate. When
setting their objective, WTO Members can take into account economic factors as well.
" WTO adjudicating bodies can only examine to what extent
the means chosen to achieve the level sought are the least
restrictive of trade, and a Member's duty to ensure that its
regulatory process generates least trade-restrictive regulatory
alternatives may be less onerous in cases of obvious serious
threats to human health than in other kinds of situations.
" In order to examine whether an SPS measure is in accordance with the SPS Agreement, WTO adjudicating bodies
can have recourse to expert witnesses. WTO adjudicating
bodies select expert witnesses from the organizations mentioned in the SPS Agreement in consultation with the parties to the dispute. They might as well allow the possibility
to parties to the dispute to name their own experts in addition to those named by the panel. WTO adjudicating bodies can decide to take into account unsolicited expertise.
* WTO Members challenging an SPS measure carry the original burden of proof to show that the relevant provisions of
the SPS Agreement have not been complied with (inconsistency of an SPS measure with any of the above points mentioned above).
" WTO adjudicating bodies can seek outside expertise to inform themselves about the well-founded of a party's argument but they have to use such expertise only to inform
themselves about the value of arguments as presented by
the parties and not in order to evaluate arguments that
have not been presented by a party.
" When a WTO Member invokes the right to take provisional
measures prior to a scientific risk assessment, under Article
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5.7 it must show a rational relationship between the measure it enacts and the risk it wants to avoid.
* When a WTO Member invokes Article 5.7, it must seek to
collect any additional information within a reasonable period of time, which in one case was deemed to be four
years.
" In case an SPS measure has found to be inconsistent with
the WTO, it must not be revoked ab initio. Remedies in the
SPS context have an ex nunc (prospective) function.
IV. SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY RISKS POSED BY
RELEASE OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS
The Manualfor Assessing Ecological and Human Health Effects
of Genetically Engineered Organisms ("Manual") summarizes the nature and rationale of genetic modification as follows:
Modern molecular methods increasingly are used to produce
organisms that express novel traits. Such methods commonly
are referred to as "genetic engineering" (that is, the isolation
of nucleic acid molecules from one organism and their subsequent introduction into another organism in such a way that
makes them part of the permanent genetic make-up of the
recipient and allows them to be inherited by offspring). Genetic engineering techniques currently are used for such diverse purposes as improvement of agricultural crops and crop
yields, enhancement of farmed fish and shellfish broodstocks
and their associated yields, production of microbes for biand changes in disoremediation and other specific tasks, 72
ease-transmission rates by insect vectors.
The Manual identifies four broad types of environmental or
human health risk that can arise from the new organisms that
are the result of genetic modification (the process of genetic
modification is not intrinsically hazardous-the risks arise from
the characteristics of specific organisms produced from the process).
The first kind of risk is that which arises from characteristics
that produce "changes in ecological roles and functions."7 3 The
Manual gives the example of "increased weediness among herbi72. Scientists' Working Group on Biosafety, Manual for Assessing Ecological and
Human Health Effects of Genetically Engineered Organisms (1998), at http://www.edmondsinstitute.org/manual.htmI [hereinafter Scientists' Working Group].
73. Id.
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cide-tolerant crops. Increased weediness could have potential
negative impacts on surrounding agricultural fields or on wild
vegetation in nearby plant communities."7 4 The second kind of
risk is "changes in genetic relationships."7 5 This occurs when genetically modified organisms are released into a setting where
they cross-breed with other non-modified organisms. While
cross-breeding of this kind is not intrinsically hazardous, it can in
some cases produce contamination of economically important
crops or even extinction of some species. The third kind of risk
is characterized as "indirect effects."76 This kind of risk occurs
simply through the interaction over time of novel organisms to a
particular ecosystem, that has not evolved their present characteristics in natural relationship with that ecosystem. The risks
here include "changes in population mating structure, alteration
of competitive hierarchies, disruption of trophic cascades, and
modification of physical and chemical environments on which
native species depend."7 7
The fourth kind of risk, which is the one that has most captured the public imagination, is "changes in allergenicity, toxicity, or nutritional composition of foods."7 8 I may know that I am
not allergic to non-modified tomatoes, but how do I know that
genetically modified versions do not have characteristics that release allergins to which I risk a severe reaction?
Because genetic modification is relatively new as a commercial technology, large scale empirical studies of these various effects are lacking. For obvious safety reasons, field trials have generally been small and undertaken with every effort to contain
any large-scale risk from the trial.79 One problem, identified by
independent scientists, is that much of the relevant information
and technical expertise resides with the industrial interests that
have a stake in marketing GMOs, or with scientists and researchers with strong industry affiliations. Independent regulatory authorities evaluating risks from GMOs, therefore, face important
information asymmetries. Nevertheless, there is an increasing
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See
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body of research that is independent of industry, ° although the
results and methodology are often ferociously contested by the
industry and its experts.
V. PITH AND SUBSTANCE OF EUROPEAN UNION
REGULATION OF DELIBERATE RELEASE OF
GENETICALL Y MODIFIED ORGANISMS
The original centerpiece of EU regulation of GMOs is Directive 90/219/EEC. This Directive was amended in 1997, primarily with a view to introducing compulsory labelling of products containing GMOs. There are related, detailed regulations
with respect to use of GMOs in pharmaceuticals, novel foods,
feeds, and seeds; but, generally speaking these suppose and supplement the general regulatory approach contained in directive
90/219/EEC as amended.8" The approach in the Directive is to
base approval of the deliberate release of GMOs or their marketing in products in the EU, on prior case-by-case assessment of
risk to human health and the environment. GMOs and GMO
products are only to be approved if they are determined to be
"safe" for the environment and human health, on the basis of
scientific risk assessment. The first step in this process is for the
importer or manufacturer to notify the relevant authority of an
EU member state, requesting permission for release or placing
on the market. The notifying entity is required to supply a range
of information in its possession that is needed to allow for an
assessment of risk to human health and to the environment. If
the member state authority approves the request, the Commission and other member states are to be given an opportunity to
file objections. A decision is then taken at the Community level
by weighted majority voting in the Council. The process of the
decision making at the community level, provision is made for
consultation with the scientific committees of the Commission.
Since the entry into force of the original Directive, eighteen requests have been approved.8 2 However, since 1998, in response
80. See, e.g., Dr. Charles Benbrook, Who Control and Who Will Benefit from Plant
Genomics?, Presented before The 2000 Genome Seminar: Genomic Revolution in the
Fields: Facing the Needs of the New Millennium, AAAS Annual Meeting, Washington,
D.C. (Feb. 19, 2000), at http://www.biotechinfo.net/AAASgen.html.
81. European Commission, Facts on GMOs in EU, MEMO/00/43 (July 13, 2000)
(outlining roadmap of these regulatory schemes).
82. Id.
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to increased public concern about GMOs many member states
have instituted a de facto moratorium on approvals. In some
cases, products authorized for placing on the market have been
banned, based on Article XVI of the original Directive, which
allows member states to take such action "provisionally," where
they have 'justified reasons" on human health or environmental
grounds.
It is against this backdrop that the Directive has recently
been revised, the outcome of a reconciliation exercise between
the Commission and Council and the Parliament. The Joint
Text approved by the Conciliation Committee8 3 was adopted by
the European Parliament in a legislative resolution of February
14, 2001.84
A. InternationalStandards, SPS, and European Regulation of GMOs
Is evolving EU regulation, especially as reflected in
amended directive 90/220, "based on" international standards,
guidelines, and recommendations, within the meaning of Article
3.1 of the SPS? Moreover, does it "conform to" international
standards, within the meaning of 3.2? In the case of food safety,
which is only one of the regulatory concerns in the case of
GMOs, the relevant international standards are, according to
Annex A of the SPS, those of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, and joint endeavor of the Food and Agriculture Organization ("FAO") and the World Health Organization ("WHO").
The Codex has established an Ad Hoc Intergovernmental
Task Force on Foods Derived from Biotechnology, which is
charged with the task of developing standards for assessment of
the safety of foods derived from biotechnology by the year
2004.85 In addition, certain issues related to the regulation of
GMOs are under consideration at the Codex Committee on
General Principles (including issues related to the precautionary
principle and labelling).
From the SPS perspective the issue is how Articles 3.1 and
3.2 should be applied when the Codex is explicitly in the process
83. CSL 3664/2000, hereinafter, "Joint Text."
84. PE R5 0075/2001.
85. SeeWORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, REPORT OF THE FIRST
AD Hoc INTERGOVERNMENTAL TASK FORCE ON FOODS DERIVED
(Mar. 14, 2000).
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of developing international standards, but these have not yet
been promulgated. Pursuant to SPS Annex A.3(d), where food
safety matters are "not covered" by Codex, reference is to be had
to appropriate standards, guidelines, and recommendations of
other relevant international organizations. Does "not covered"
include a situation where the Codex is seized of the matter but
has not yet promulgated standards? We submit that such a situation should indeed come under the meaning of "not covered,"
for the alternative would be to ignore other relevant international standards until Codex has acted, which would be contrary
to some of the general objectives of the SPS Agreement, including the encouragement of the use of harmonized international
standards where they exist.8 6
There are a range of non-Codex standards, guidelines, and
recommendations concerning the regulation of risks from the
release of GMOs, which deal both with food safety- and non-food
safety related risks of GMOs. Of high relevance is the Statement
of the FAO, one of the Codex partners, on biotechnology. According to the Statement:
[The] FAO supports a science-based evaluation system that
would objectively determine the benefits and risks of each
GMO. This calls for a cautious case-by-case approach to address legitimate concerns for the biosafety of each product or
process prior to its release. The possible effects on biodiversity, the environment and food safety need to be evaluated,
and the extent to which the benefits of the product or process outweigh its risks assessed. The evaluation process
should also take into consideration experience gained by national regulatory authorities in clearing such products. Careful monitoring of the post-release effects of these products
and processes is also essential to ensure their continued
safety
87
to human beings, animals and the environment.
While these suggestions are perhaps too general to be considered as standards, they are certainly at a minimum, recommendations or guidelines.
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, concluded at Montreal
last year-to which the European Union member states are sig86. See SPS Agreement.
87. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAO Statement on
Biotechnology (2000), at http://www.fao.org/biotech/state.htm [hereinafter FAO Statement].
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natories-facilitates the approach, recommended by the FAO, of
case-by-case analysis prior to release, by imposing rights and obligations with respect to advance notice of proposed cross-boundary movement of GMOs and related material."8 The Protocolalso
requires scientifically sound assessment of risk (Article 15), and
in an Annex promulgates general principles and guidelines with
respect to the methodology and factors to be taken into account
in risk assessment. Further, the Protocol states that:
Measures based on risk assessment shall be imposed to the
extent necessary to prevent adverse effects of the living modified organism on conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account risk to human health,
within the territory, of the Party of import.8 9
Within 270 days of notification, a country of import must provide its decision to the notifier as to whether the import is permitted, and if so, under what conditions (Article 10).'o To date
sixty-eight states have signed the Protocol; because it is open to
signature by any WTO Member (in fact by any State), the Protocol
qualifies as the standards, guidelines, or recommendations of a
relevant international organization, within the meaning of SPS
Annex A.
By contrast, although the OECD has promulgated various
guidelines with respect to biotechnology, as an organization
whose membership is not open to all WTO Members, these pronouncements do not qualify as international standards within
the meaning of the SPS. 1
The main features of EU regulation, as reflected in the revised directive, and the novel foods regulation, are based on the
approach now formally reflected in the international standards,
namely case-by-case risk assessment prior to release of each individual GMO.12 Like both the FAO Statement and the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety, EU regulation requires such risk assessment.
88. See Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Feb. 23, 2000, at http.www.jiwlp.com/contents/Cartagena-Protocol.htm [hereinafter CartagenaProtocol on Biosafety].
89. Id. art. 16.2.
90. Id. art. 10.
91. However, to the extent that the parties to an SPS dispute are also OECD members, OECD guidelines would still be relevant as sources of treaty interpretation under
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 115 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27. 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
92. Art 4.2, 4.3.
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The amended Directive requires an environmental risk assessment ("ERA") to be undertaken by the notifier, which provides
the basis for an assessment report by competent member state
authorities. While not identical, the kinds of risks and factors to
be taken into account in ERA and in the Assessment Report are
quite similar to those set out in the CartagenaProtocol on Biosafety.
In several respects, the EU regulation is more favorable to imports than the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety-it specifies a
shorter time period for an initial decision of national authorities
on whether release is to be permitted (ninety days). The
amended EU directive specifically bans restrictions or prohibitions by member states on the placing on the market of GMOs
that comply with the requirements of the directive (Article 22);
in effect then restrictions on market access are as a matter of law
limited to those based on health and environmental risks.
Does the EU regulation "conform to" international standards within the meaning of 3.2 of the SPS Agreement? The
meaning of "conform to" is, according to the Appellate Body (as
noted in the first part of this Essay), stricter than "based on."
Article 3.2 must be read in conjunction with Article 3.3-thus
the real issue is whether in all relevant respects the EU regulation does not attempt to achieve a higher level of protection than
that which would be achieved by international standards.
There are several relevant respects in which EU regulation
could be considered to aim at a higher level of protection.
While the FAO Statement appears to impose upon risk assessment a kind of cost benefit analysis, where if the prospective
benefits of a GMO outweigh the risks identified in risk assessment the GMO might well be released, the approach of the EU
directive is apparently more cautious. The the amended directive provides that "Member States shall ensure that all appropriate measures are taken to avoid adverse effects on human health
and the environment which might arise from the deliberate release or placing on the market of GMOs."9 3 The principles for
Environmental Risk Assessment in Annex II and the Guidelines
for Assessment Reports of member state authorities in Annex VI
focus exclusively on risks. Potential benefits of release or placing
on the market appear to play no part in the approval process.
However, the FAO Statement does not suggest that in all cases
93. Art. 4.1.
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release is appropriate if benefits outweigh CoSts. 9 4 It does, nevertheless, call for an assessment of benefits in relation to costs.
The CartagenaProtocolon Biosafety calls for the taking of measures that are "necessary" to protect biodiversity and human
health as well. Does the use of the expression "appropriate" in
the EU Directive indicate a higher standard of protection than
the necessity test in the CartagenaProtocol on Biosafety? The answer is not ascertainable in the abstract, but depends upon the
actual practice of EU member states in implementing the Directive, which so far, under the 1990 Directive, including as
amended in 1997, has varied considerably.9 5 However, the
Guidelines for Assessment Reports define the relevant risks to
human health and the environment from GMOs as "any new
risks that may arise from the release of GMOs as compared to the
release of the corresponding non-modified organism(s)."9 6
Thus, while the amended directive requires that all appropriate
measures be taken to ensure "safety," the standard for safety is a
relative one-relative to the existing levels of safety with respect
to corresponding non-modified organisms. By contrast, the standard in the CartagenaProtocol on Biosafety is an absolute one, requiring that all necessary measures be taken to prevent harm to
the environment from GMOs, apparently regardless of whether
a signatory is taking comparable precautions against environmental harm or human health impacts from non-GMO products
and materials.9 7 In this sense, the level of protection in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety may actually be higher, rather than
lower, than that provided for in the amended Directive. However, it is to be noted that Article 32 of the amended directive
envisages that the Cartagena Protocol shall be fully implemented
in EU law, and that where necessary there be further amendments to the directive in order to accomplish this.
Secondly, while the amended directive contains even more
complex and precise provisions on labelling and traceability
than did the 1997 amendment to the 1990 GMOs directive,
neither the FAO Statement nor the CartagenaProtocol on Biosafety
94. See FAO Statement, supra note 87.
95. See Ren6 von Schomberg, An Appraisal of the Working in Practice of Directive 90/
220/EEC on the Deliberate Release of Genetically Modifled Organisms,Jan. 2, 1998, at http://
www.europarl.eu.int/stoa/publi/pdf/gmostudy-en.pdf.
96. Annex VI(4) (emphasis added).
97. See CartagenaProtocol on Biosafety, supra note 88.
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explicitly requires labelling. However, the FAO Statement declares that "[c]areful monitoring of the post release effects of
these products and processes is also essential to ensure their continued safety human beings, animals and the environment."98
Without the ability to identify and trace the presence of GMOs
in particular products or processes, monitoring their effects
once released would be highly impracticable, if possible at all.
Hence, labelling and traceability requirements are, in the context of GMOs, a necessary implication of the notion of "careful
monitoring of post release effects," and in this sense conform to
the standards, guidelines, and recommendations in the FAO
Statement. Moreover, as is recognized in the provisions in the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety on transboundary shipment of
GMOs, identification may be crucial to risk management and
control, preventing inadvertent release of GMOs in contexts or
ecosystems where they can cause damage. In the case of foods
and food products as well, labelling may be a "necessary" measure for the protection of human health within the meaning of
Article 16 of the CartagenaProtocol on Biosafety, alerting persons
with allergies, or hyper-sensitivity to certain foods that the
properties in a food containing GMOs may be different from
those in the non-modified version, which are known to such individuals as safe for them.9 9 This is discussed further below.
Finally, the amended directive, in the guidelines for Assessment Reports by member state authorities, provides for "assessment of whether the genetic modification has been characterized sufficiently for the purpose of evaluating any risks to human
health and the environment."' ° This raises the possibility that
an assessment report could come to the conclusion that a GMO
not be released on precautionary grounds, i.e., because of not
being able to characterize the modification sufficiently in order
to evaluate risks to human health and the environment. This is
reinforced by references to the Precautionary Principle in a
number of places in the amended directive, and especially in Article 4.1, which states that all appropriate measures are to be
taken to avoid adverse effects "in accordance with the precautionary principle." However, this conforms with the articulation
98. FAO Statement, supra note 87.
99. See Gillian Hadfield & David Thomson, An Information-BasedApproach to Labelling Biotechnology Consumer Products, 21 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 193 (1998).
100. Annex VI, para. 3.
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of the Precautionary Principle in the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, Article 11.8 of which provides:
Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information and knowledge regarding the extent of potential adverse effects of a living modified organism on the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in the
Party of import, taking also into account risks to human
health, shall not prevent that Party from taking a decision, as
appropriate with regard to the import of that living modified
organisms intended for direct use as food or fee, or for
processing, in order to avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects. 1'
In sum, it is our view that evolving EU regulation as reflected in the amended directive, and in the novel foods regulation, conforms to such international standards, recommendations, and guidelines as now exist, within the meaning of the SPS
Agreement. At the same time, since, as noted, international
standards are evolving, particularly in Codex Alimentarius, it is
far from an academic exercise to consider, arguendo, if EU regulation, as it is evolving, could be sustained under the SPS if it did
not "conform to" international standards, but sought to achieve
a higher level of protection.
B. Articles 2.2 and 5.1-5.3 of the SPS
To the extent that there are elements of EU regulation that
seek to establish a higher level protection, they do not enjoy the
presumption that they are maintained on the basis of sufficient
scientific evidence 0 2 and they must be maintained consistently
with the various provisions of Article 5.1"3 As recalled, in the
Varietals case, the Appellate Body, elaborating on its decision in
the Hormones case, stated that the sufficient evidence standard in
Article 2.2 is met where there is a rational connection between
10 4
scientific evidence on the record and the measures taken.
However, the Appellate Body also indicated that a case-by-case
101. CartagenaProtocol on Biosafety, supra note 88, at art. 11.8.
102. See SPS Agreement art. 2.2.
103. See European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (stating interpretation by Appellate Body of art. 3.3 of SPS Agreement).
104. See Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, Report of the Appellate
Body, WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 22 1999).
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contextual judgement is needed about what kind of underlying
scientific evidence satisfies the requirement of rational connection. In some cases, this would have to include evidence probative of causal relationships.
To recall, Article 5.1 of the SPS requires that measures be
based on an assessment of risk "appropriate in the circumstances." Articles 5.2 and 5.3 list a variety of factors to be taken
into account in such risk assessments.
The amended directive requires that a member state determination of whether release and marketing of GMOs or GMO
products is permitted be based on an Environmental Risk Assessment. This ERA is to be conducted by the firm requesting the
permission. On the basis of this ERA, the member state authorities must prepare an Assessment Report. As already noted, the
Report must include, inter alia, "[and] assessment of whether the
genetic modification has been characterized sufficiently for purpose of evaluating any risks to human health and environment,"11 5 and "[iildentification of any new risk to human health
and the environment that may arise from the release of the
GMOs in question as compared to the release of the corresponding non-modified organisms, based on the environmental risk
assessment. ' 6 Where it is concluded that a GMO should not be
placed on the market, reasons must be given in the assessment
report. While these provisions do not adopt the exact language
of SPS Article 2.2, it is fairly obvious that the amended directive
requires that the decision to prohibit release or marketing of
GMOs be based on reasons grounded in scientific evidence of
risks to human health and the environment. The only apparent
exception is where the competent authority determines that
there is insufficient scientific evidence to evaluate risk, in which
case the overall approach of the amended directive would appear to permit a decision against release or marketing on precautionary grounds. In such a case, there would be a violation of
SPS Article 2.2 unless the decision could be justified under SPS
Article 5.7, to which we shall turn later in this article.
With respect to the labelling and traceability requirements
as they exist in the amended directive, 0 7 an issue might seem to
105. Annex VI.3.
106. I.
107. See Art. 19.3(e), Art. 21, Annex IV.
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arise under Article 2.2, since the labelling and traceability requirements apply generally, regardless of the results of case-bycase risk assessment. However, these requirements must be understood in light of the inherent limitations of existing techniques of risk assessment to achieve high levels of certainty about
the health and environmental effects of GMOs.'0 8 The quality
and precision of risk assessment may depend upon increasing
information about the effects of release of GMOs in the real
world. Regardless of whether a new GMO has passed a risk assessment, there is likely to be continuing uncertainty as to its
actual health and ecological effects. Without labelling and traceability, identifying genetic modification as a possible cause of
real world health and ecological effects would be rendered
much more difficult and costly. It would be contrary to the principle of effective treaty interpretation to read Article 2.2 of the
SPS as raising a bar to measures that are themselves conditions
precedent to fully adequate scientific assessment of risk, or to
providing Members with a more adequate scientific foundation
for their measures in the future. Moreover, as the Appellate
Body emphasized in Hormones, risk assessment-in which it is determined whether scientific evidence is sufficient-includes consideration of the requirements of controlling risk in the real
world, not just the laboratory. Thus, even if the labeling requirement is not the outcome of the case-by-case risk assessment required to determine whether more restrictive measures are appropriate, it can nevertheless be justified, in terms of a cost-effective response with respect to foods at least. But for labelling, the
real and largely uncontroversial risk that genetically modified
foods may contain allergins and toxins not contained in the nongenetically modified versions would be indistinguishable to the
"thin-skull" or particularly susceptible consumer.
The substantive threshold of "sufficient" scientific evidence
in SPS Article 2.2 is closely related to the procedural requirements of risk assessment as set out in SPS Articles 5.1-5.3. These
latter provisions require that SPS measures be based on a scientific assessment or risk and specify some of the factors that must
be taken into account. As discussed in depth in the first part of
this Essay, in the Salmon case, the Appellate Body held that
108. See Von Schomberg, supra note 95; see also Scientists' Working Group, supra
note 72.
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under Article 5, a risk assessment must establish not simply the
mere possibility of a risk event occurring but rather the likelihood or probability of such an event." 9 At the same time, in not
requiring that such assessment of likelihood or probability be
quantitative, the AB apparently embraced the view that the SPS
Agreement does not establish or impose thresholds for scientific
certainty, determinacy, or margins of error, below which SPS
measures are not considered to be "based on" scientific risk assessment, other than the threshold of "sufficient scientific evidence" in Article 2.2. It is in this sense that the precautionary
principle is built into Article 5 as a whole-it does not prevent
regulators from acting in response to possible serious harm even
where there are significant elements of uncertainty or indeterminacy in the risk assessment.
In the case of GMOs, these elements of uncertainty or indeterminacy are of several different kinds. One kind of uncertainty relates to the extent one can extrapolate results of small
field trials to larger regions, populations, or ecosystems. Investigators have been understandably reluctant to expose larger
populations of humans or other species to such trials, precisely
because the extent of adverse effects is not well known yet.'
One response might be to conduct computer simulations based
upon existing knowledge of the properties of larger ecosystems.
But here too there are inevitable elements of uncertainty or imprecision in predicting effects in actual ecosystems. Another
kind of uncertainty relates however to the simple failure to design and conduct a particular experiment: "[F]or example, we
may not know how bio-tech crops will affect soil micro-organisms
simply because experiments have not been designed to detect
such effects." It is doubtful whether this kind of uncertainty in
risk assessment could be acceptable under the SPS, since it results from a failure to undertake possible further investigations.
However, in the case of prevention of life threatening risks
where those further investigations are unwarranted from the
perspective of costs or would result in delays of a kind that could
result in irreparable harm, it might be possible to mount ajustification for regulations on the basis of more uncertain results.
109. See Australia-MeasuresAffecting Importation of Salmon, Report of the Appellate
Body, WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998).
110. See generally, Von Schomberg, supra note 95.
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The Principles for Environmental Risk Assessment in Annex
II of the amended directive address themselves to the range of
factors stated in SPS Articles 5.1-.3.111 Potential adverse effects
of the GMO are to be identified, as well as the magnitude of
such effects, and the likelyhood of their occurrence. This is to
be the basis for an estimate of risk to health and the environment, to the extent that the state of the art permits such an estimate to be made. The ERA is to be carried out in a scientifically
sound and transparent manner. They are moreover broadly consistent as already noted with the risk assessment guidelines present in the CartagenaProtocol on Biosafety and they are reflective as
for instance in the
well of best scientific practice, as codified
112
Scientists' Work Group on Manual.
With respect to the requirement stated in the definition of
risk assessment in Annex A, paragraph 4 of the SPS, that a risk
assessment evaluate the "likelihood" of adverse effects materializing the Principles in Annex II of the amended directive would
appear to satisfy the concern of the Appellate Body in Salmon
that evaluation of "likelihood" not merely be a matter of stating
a vague or abstract possibility, but consist in an effort to state
with some precision or specificity the incidence of risk.11 3 Thus,
evaluation of the "likelihood of the occurrence of each identified potential adverse effect" is required, taking into account the
real-world conditions of the environment into which the release
is going to take place.' 14 Similar precision is required with respect to estimation of the magnitude of the harmful consequences. Moreover, with respect to effects, these must be clearly
classified in terms of direct or indirect, and immediate or
delayed.
Of particular importance, given the apparent availability of
more precise and adequate techniques of risk assessment in
cases like Salmon and Varietals,1 5 is the stipulation in the Principles that "estimation" of risk be made as far as possible, "given
111. See Annexes II, VI.
112. See generally, Scientists' Working Group, supra note 72.
113. See Australia-MeasuresAffecting Importation of Salmon, Report of the Appellate
Body, WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998).
114. Common Position Annex II, Part C, para. B.
115. The defendants in both of these cases did not give adequate explanations of
their failure to employ.
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' 16
the state of the art.""

C. Articles 5.4 and 5.6 of the SPS: Least-Restrictiveness of Trade
Article 5.4 of the SPS states that Members should take into
account the "objective of minimizing negative trade effects"
when determining the appropriate level of protection. In turn,
Article 5.6 requires that Members ensure that measures adopted
are the least trade restrictive necessary to achieve the appropriate level of protection, "taking into account technical and economic feasibility."
As the Appellate Body has emphasized particularly in the
Salmon case, the application of Article 5.6 requires a characterization of a Member's appropriate level of protection. As we have
already suggested, the level of protection implicit in the
amended directive is that of "safety," relative to the corresponding non-genetically modified product or process and as determined by case-by-case risk assessment. In other words, the EU
judges unacceptable any margin of risk beyond that posed by
non-genetically modified equivalents. To what extent does this
level of protection reflect the obligation to "take into account"
the objective of minimizing negative trade effects in SPS Article
5.4? In this regard it should be noted that, in selecting as an
effective baseline the degree of safety already required of nonmodified organisms, the EU has chosen a level of protection
consistent with the established expectations of its trading partners as to the conditions of market access for their products and
processes to the common market, insofar as human health and
environmental safety are concerned.
With respect to the least trade restrictive requirement in
SPS Article 5.6, there are a number of features in amended directive that have the effect of limiting the potential trade restrictiveness of member states' measures on GMOs. First, as noted
above, 22 provides that once a GMO or GMO-containing product has been approved as safe on the basis of risk assessment, no
further restrictions or prohibitions on market access shall be imposed by member states' authorities (except where there is new
information suggesting imminent threat to the environment or
human health). Secondly, to the extent that the EU's appropriate level of protection can be satisfied by less onerous or more
116. Annex II, C.2.4. para. 5.
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expeditious approval procedures, provision for these is made in
the amended directive.1 1 7 Thirdly, the amended directive contemplates the possibility of conditional consent to placing of
GMOs on the market, i.e., that through appropriate methods of
risk containment or risk management, the appropriate level of
safety can be maintained without the obviously more trade-restrictive response of a denial of permission to market the GMO
product or process."' Finally, in order that labelling requirements not become an unnecessary impediment to market access,
in cases where ascertaining whether there are "adventitious"
traces of authorized GMOs in a particular product is technically
unfeasible, the amended directive allows member states to establish a minimum threshold, below which labelling is not required. 1 9 Moreover, the time frames provided in the amended
directive for decisions on individual GMOs appear close to the
minimum that could reasonably be required to undertake the
necessary scientific verification and for regulatory decision-making consistent with meaningful consultation of scientific experts
and the public.
The amended directive also reflects the recognition that scientific knowledge of GMOs is in a state of transition, as is the
industry itself, and thus provides for review of experience with
the directive in 2003. This review is to consider, inter alia,
whether sufficient experience has occurred with "differentiated"
i.e., streamlined procedures, to expand the scope for permitting
the release or placing on the market of GMOS without prior individualized risk assessment. 120 Thus, at a point at which scientific knowledge and regulatory experience is such that a less restrictive approach is appropriate, it is foreseen that such an approach may be adopted.
D. SPS Article 5.5: "Arbitrary or Unjustifiable Distinctions"
Article 5.5 of the SPS requires that WTO Members avoid
arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels of protection
they consider appropriate in different situations, if such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on inter117.
118.
119.
120.

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.

art.
art.
art.
art.

7.
18, 3.c.
21.2.
31.7.c.
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national trade. As already noted, the Common Position is based
on a level of protection that can be characterized as no less
safety than that attributable to corresponding non-modified organisms. However, it might be argued that, if one reads the EU's
level of protection back from the kind of measures it is proposing, which could be the approach of the Appellate Body given
that the level of protection is not explicitly stated as such in any
provision of the amended directive, in fact the level is considerably higher than that for non-modified organisms. In general,
with respect to the latter, no prior case-by-case risk assessment is
required before the product is put on the market. Among the
arguments of industry interests that proclaim GMOs to be "safe"
is that genetic engineering merely imitates-and directs to
human needs-genetic modification and adaptation of the kind
that occurs in nature itself, and thus does not impose risks that
are different in kind from those posed by cross-breeding and genetic modification of organisms in nature.
In fact, there are very important distinctive characteristics of
GMOS that make the analogy to natural processes very misleading when seen from the perspective of risk assessment and management. These are summarized by Regal:
[R]DNA differs in at least four fundamental ways from both
ordinary sexual reproduction and conventional breeding: 1)
Adaptive traits can be leap-frogged over vast phylogenetic distances to form radically new combinations of competitive features; 2) sexual reproduction and traditional breeding are
largely limited to exchanges of alleles (which are variants of
genes, and exchanges typically demand substitutions and
adaptive trade offs and compromises, but with rDNA this class
of exchange-based trade-offs can be circumvented. 3) Sexual
reproduction and traditional breeding cannot normally
reprogram the large fraction of genomes that are functionally
homozygous. But rDNA holds the potential to reprogram
fundamentally important genetic programs that are normally
protected against change. 4) Transgenes often have unusual
genetic side effects, apparently when a host organism's editthem and cannot
ing and buffering systems do not 1recognize
21
correct or control them properly.
What do these differences mean in terms of the challenges
121. Philip Regal, A BriefHistory of Biotechnology Risk Debates and Policies in the United
States (1999), at http://www.edmonds-institute.org/regal.html.
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for risk regulation? Simply put, genetic engineering removes or
alters many restraints or controls that limit variation in nature,
resulting in a vast potential expansion of variants and the speed
at which they occur. Reliance on long-acquired general knowledge of the properties of non-genetically modified foods might
be reasonable given the EU's level of protection, whereas a requirement that specific investigation be undertaken with respect
to GMOs may also be reasonable, given the same level of protection, in light of the greater degree of uncertainty and relative
speed at which new organisms with unknown risk properties relative to specific ecosystems can be created. Finally, we note that,
in the Hormones case, the Appellate Body held that there might
be a range of acceptable reasons why regulation of risks inherent
in nature in the absence of any human intervention might reflect a lower level of protection than that of risks produced or
exacerbated by human artifice. 2 2

VI. SPS AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
This brings us to Article 5.7 of SPS and its relationship to
the precautionary principle or approach. Article 5.7 allows for
provisional adoption of sanitary and phytosanitary measures
where "scientific evidence is insufficient," provided the Member
seeks more adequate information and reviews the measures accordingly within a reasonable period of time. One obvious
meaning of Article 5.7 is that it allows for provisional measures
where the state of scientific knowledge is such that the kind of
risk assessment set out in the preceding paragraphs of Article 5
is not possible. While the overall EU scheme for regulation of
GMOs in the amended directive is based on the precautionary
principle, in the sense that it requires prior approval on a caseby-case basis, rather than assuming the safety of GMOs until
proven otherwise, it is not precautionary in the sense evoked by
Article 5.7.12' As we have already noted, the amended directive
122. See European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS26/AB/R (jan. 16, 1998).
123. We suppose that some might argue that the requirement of case-by-case risk
assessment is itself an SPS measure that must be maintained on the basis of sufficient
scientific evidence, or'based on a scientific assessment of risk within the meaning of
Articles 5.1-5.3. But such an interpretation is infine casuistical. It would put, at least in
the GMO context, the EU and other Members in a "Catch-22" situation. In order to
meet the requirements of the SPS they must do risk assessment, but they cannot impose

368

FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 24:317

specifies the elements of a risk assessment based upon scientific
methodology. And in this it is consistent with the CartagenaProtocol on Biosafety as well as the particulars of SPS Articles 5.2-5.3.
Yet, as the Appellate Body suggested in Hormones, Article 5.7
does not exhaust the relevance of the precautionary principle or
the precautionary approach to the interpretation of the SPS
Agreement. Caution or pre-caution is relevant to the way that
politicians and regulators respond to elements of uncertainty, indeterminacy, and margins of error in risk assessment, especially
where if harms do materialize the consequences will be grave or
24
catastrophic. 1
As already noted, the Guidelines for Assessment Reports in
the amended directive require that the member state authority
include in its report an assessment of "whether the genetic modification has been characterized sufficiently for the purpose ' of
25
evaluating any risks to human health and the environment."'
While the amended directive does not specify what decision concerning permission to place on the market is appropriate, where
it is determined that the genetic modification has not been characterized sufficiently, clearly the possibility in such a situation that
permission would be denied is contemplated. This would precisely be the kind of case where the EU would be required to
invoke Article 5.7 to justify a denial of permission to place GMOs
on the market.
With respect to the conditions in Article 5.7, the amended
directive does not contain any provision for reconsideration of a
decision to deny permission based on new information. This
contrasts with the situation where permission has been granted,
in which case there is a formal process provided for reconsidera1 26
tion of the permission in light of new information about risks.
This being said one must interpret the requirements of SPS Article 5.7 "to seek to obtain additional information" and to review
risk assessment itself as a precondition for a decision about their measures, unless they
already have a scientific basis for doing so. However, once the properties of a standard
set of GMOs are better known, as discussed above, imposing this kind of requirement
could be more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve the EU's appropriate level of
protection; but the common position provides for consideration of streamlined procedures as better information about GMOs evolves.
124. See Katherine Barrett, Applying the PrecautionaryPrinciple to Agricultural Biotechnology, in SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH NETWORK (2000).
125. Annex VI.3.
126. See id. art. 20.
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the measure within a reasonable period of time, in light of the
overall structure of the amended directive. Since information
about the characteristics of GMOs is in the first instance in the
hands of those who produce them, the amended directive clearly
places the onus providing adequate information for an assessment
based upon scientific evaluation of risks upon the party seeking
permission. If, in a particular case the information is inadequate, the precautionary action by a member state authority may
be taken. Nothing in the amended directive prevents a notifier
who has been denied permission, from reapplying for permission, while providing more adequate information for purposes
of evaluating risk. By not limiting in any way, or prejudicing
such re-applications, the EU is in effect inviting, or "seeking" additional information. With respect to the SPS requirement of
review of measures taken under Article 5.7, there is nothing in
the structure and language of 5.7 that suggests that a WTO
Member must undertake a review, in the absence of interest on
the part of the market actor with an interest in the measure being reconsidered. In effect-as already suggested-a notifier
can trigger review of a decision, not to permit release or placing
on the market of GMOs, simply by submitting a new notification
at any time, which the competent member state authority is required to respond to, based on the information provided in the
notification, within the same time limitations as applied in the
first instance.
To interpret the requirement Article 5.7 as imposing an obligation to review SPS measures on one's own motion, as it were,
would be administratively inefficient. Such review could be
moot for any number of reasons. The GMO in question may
have proven to lack the economic benefits predicted for it, and
thus may no longer be a competitive product; another company
may have succeeded in obtaining permission for a competing
product that is more effective in achieving the same and similar
results, and so on. In any case, for a review to be effective, the
notifier will itself have to act to provide further information, as
discussed above. In sum, in the GMOs context, a scheme that
permits reapplication for permission at any time, and effectively
invites submission of new information with any such reapplication, represents an efficient means of ensuring that precautionary measures are not maintained longer than is justified by lack
of adequate scientific evidence
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CONCLUSIONS
Although public controversy about GMOs remains intense
within the Union, and there are broader ethical concerns raised
by this kind of manipulation of nature, the thrust of EU-level
regulation as it is evolving from the original 1990 Directive
through the amended directive is to base decisions about the
placing on the market of GMO products within the Union on a
case-by-case scientific assessment of risk to human health and the
environment. This is subject to the possibility of precautionary
action, where there is not sufficient scientific knowledge available to evaluate risk in the case of some particular GMO. This
approach is consonant with evolving international standards, as
reflecting in the FAO Statement on Biotechnology and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. The basic structure of EU regulation
as reflected in the amended directive raises few serious risks of
violating the SPS Agreement.
However, where individual member states choose to act on
the basis, in whole or in part, of ethical concerns or considerations (which the amended directive allows them to "take into
account"), and where the measure could not also be wholly justified based on a scientific assessment of risk, a situation could
arise where the appropriate WTO framework would be Article
III of GATT and, depending upon whether ethical concerns
would be found on a basis for distinguishing modified and unmodified products as "unlike" products, Article XX(a) of GATT,
the "public morals" provision might also be justified.
However, one of the most promising features of the amended
directive is the emphasis on public consultation, and publicity
and transparency of reasons for decisions with respect to GMOs.
Public dissemination of risk assessments and assessment reports,
and consultation procedures prior to each decision, as well as in
the course of EU-level review of such decisions, may well lead to
a more focused and informed public discourse about what is at
stake in the GMOs debate. At the same time, such transparency
and publicity provides trading partners with additional assurances against the possibility that hidden protection is embedded
in case-by-case regulatory decisionmaking.

